Math 160: Study Guide - Chapters 9-10
- Solve a strictly determined game. Show all work.
- Eliminate any recessive rows and/or columns. Do NOT solve the game.
- Create a transition matrix from the transition diagram.
- Solve a 2×2 non-strictly determined game. Show all work. Know the
formulas from section 10.2.
- Show the strategies and find the value of the game if both players
randomly select a strategy. Show the strategies and find the value of the
game if one player randomly chooses a strategy, but the other player uses
their optimal strategy (use the calculator to find the optimal
strategy).
- Absorbing Markov Chain problem. Given a transition matrix, find the
fundamental matrix and the long term probabilities of moving from any
transient state to an absorbing state.
- Setup a game problem and then use the calculator to find the solution.
- A final tableau from a game is given. Give the optimal row and column
strategies and the value of the game.
- Markov chain problem. Fill in the missing probabilities in the
transition matrix, draw a transition diagram, give an initial state matrix
and find a state matrix for future time period. Find the steady state
matrix.
- Absorbing Markov chain problem. The take home exam had you find the fundamental matrix F and the matrix of long term probabilities FR. Use these to answer some questions.
- Absorbing Markov chain application problem. The fundamental matrix F,
the probabilities of moving from a transient state to an absorbing state
(matrix FR), and the sum of each row of the fundamental matrix are given.
Use them to answer the questions.
- Write the linear programming problems necessary to solve a game. Do not
attempt to solve the game.
- Solve a game using the calculator. The column player lets the row player
know what her strategy will be, find the best a priori strategy for
the row player (this is the best strategy for the row player if he knows
what the column player will do) and the value of the game under this
strategy. Find the value of the game if the row player uses his a
priori strategy, but the column player uses her optimal strategy
instead of the one she said she was going to use. Find the best a priori
strategy for the column player (what should she play if she knows what the
row player will do because he thinks he knows what she is going to do).
- Find the solution to a game using the calculator. Find the value if both
players play randomly (all choices are not equally likely - you need to have
a concept of what a relative frequency is). Find the payoffs for the row
player under the expected value, maximax, maximin, and minimax criteria.
Notes
- Problems 1-4 must be solved without a calculator. The game
program on the calculator can be used for the rest of the test whenever you
need to find an optimal strategy.
- Problems 5-12 must be worked alone, but the game program on the
calculator should be used when finding optimal strategies.
- Problems 13-14 can be worked in groups of up to three people.
- The solution to a game consists of the optimal row strategy P*, the
optimal column strategy Q*, and the value of the game v. Make sure you give
all three parts, not just the value of the game.
- Move swiftly through the first portion of the test, the later questions
are harder (which is why you get to work in a group).
- Question 10 is composed of two parts. 8 of the points are on the
in-class portion and 4 points are on the take home.
Points per problem
# |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 |
Total |
Pts |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
8 |
8+4 |
12 |
8 |
10 |
14 |
100 |